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Introduction 
In 2013, the Euromaidan protests (also known as the Euromaidan Revolution and the 
Ukrainian Revolution) began as opposition to the Ukrainian government’s rejection of the EU 
Association Agreement. It turned into an uprising that included a wide range of issues which 
focused on “civic patriotism and ethnic nationalism” (Kulyk 2016). The language issue in 
Ukraine caught my attention when the main square in Kyiv was engulfed in fires due to burning 
tires. The square was full of protesters, filled with bright blue and yellow Ukrainian flags 
alongside EU flags (See Figure 1). I read an interesting BBC article entitled “A year after 
Euromaidan: expert opinions” that evaluated the changes that happened after Euromaidan 
protests, and I wanted to find my own answers to the questions (BBC News Русская служба 
2014). Specifically, as a Russian speaking Ukrainian, I was mostly concerned about the article's 
interpretation of the revolution as a fight against Russian aggression. I was also interested in how 
the Euromaidan changed Ukraine.  
Right after the Euromaidan, attitudes towards Russian speaking Ukrainians – actually, 
anyone who speaks Russian – turned hostile (Kulyk 2015). These changes were caused by few 
reasons. Russia’s aggressive political involvement resulted in annexation of Crimean Peninsula, 
and it continued with the war in eastern Ukraine, in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Kulyk 2016). 
In a meantime, Ukraine was working towards strengthening country’s ties and friendship with 
Europe. Similar anti-Russian sentiment and movement towards Europe were a core of the 
Orange Revolution that happened in 2004 in Kyiv (Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Sakwa 2015). 
 The ability to speak Ukrainian as the native language has been very important, and these 
kinds of sentiments increased after the Euromaidan revolution in 2013. The Euromaidan protests 
reinterpreted the historical experiences of Ukraine by redefining who the nation is and what it 
Schastliva Salazar 3 
stands for. As a Russian speaking Ukrainian, I have always thought that Russians and Ukrainians 
are united by their Slavic kinship. However, after the Euromaidan protests my perspective of a 
united Ukraine with two ethnicities has changed. I argue that the Euromaidan protests shifted 
Ukrainian national identity, which became distinctly tied to the Ukrainian language and 
decreased use of the Russian language in everyday life, media and politics.  
Language is a major factor for claiming national identity in Ukraine today. As scholars 
have noted, national identity serves as a link between the individual and the society” (Prizel 
1998, 19). The hardening of ethnic, linguistic, and national identities led to escalation in the 
eastern part of Ukraine and created questions about the nature of Ukrainian identity (Onuch, 
Hale, & Sasse 2018). The manifestation of national identity and nation-building through 
privileging one language over the other doesn’t seem to be working right now, considering the 
multiethnic and bi-lingual population of the country (Bilaniuk 2005, 23). The Ukrainian 
government is moving fast to implement the Ukrainian language policies that subordinate the 
Russian language. As a result, we can see how linguistic preference is working to reshape and 
transform national government policies and identities. 
Literature review 
National identity generally belongs to a certain collectivity and can be identified on 
individual and collective levels (Kulyk 2016). National identity can relate to either ethnic 
(cultural) or civic (political) communities, which are commonly discussed as co-existent terms. 
National identities tend to be expressed through common history, territory, culture and a spoken 
language. That is, during the Soviet Union Ukrainians didn’t have their ‘own’ independent state, 
rather it was a more superficially autonomous unit belonging to a larger political entity - 
Moscow. As a result, Ukrainians “perceive their national distinction solely in cultural terms”, 
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with references to history, place of residence or language (Kulyk 2016, 590). Moreover, 
membership of the nation was perceived in ethnocultural more than civic terms due to lack of 
political distinctiveness from other socialist republics (Kulyk 2016). Kuzio (2002) explains that 
during the USSR, the question of nationality had been resolved through homogenizing policies 
of urbanization, which meant that non-Russians didn’t fit in Soviet studies and nationality 
question was ignored by Sovietologists. 
National identities change and shift over time to provide a sense of belonging to group 
members, to develop positive self-image, to give common ownership of land as well as to justify 
a societal group that was once victimized (Korostelina 2013, 293). The major shift in these 
identities, though, tends to take place after economic or political crises. In “Mapping national 
identity narratives in Ukraine'' (2013, 293), Korostelina explains that national identity is “a 
product of both (1) ethnic history and identity of the community, religion, and belief system, and 
(2) dominant ideology and conscious manipulation, including commemoration, ideology, and 
symbolism”. National identity is constantly being reconstructed in order to serve different 
purposes, such as a sense of belonging, cultural development, coping as a group of people who 
have been victimized. During crisis and instability, the nature of national identification and 
relations with others often changes (Torbakov 2011, 210). Torbakov (2011) explains that the 
rapid politicizing and instrumentalizing of history immediately takes place. 
National identity relies on how a group interprets its history; therefore, these perceptions 
point to a certain direction, and overtime constitutes 'collective memory' (Prizel 1998, 14). This 
collective memory leads to a definition of the 'national idea' and adopting specific courses of 
action in the local, international and global conducts. Nations derive their sense of identity from 
common language, geographic location or cultural practices. Using the Nietzsche concept of 
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ressentiment, Prizel (1998) cites Greenfeld, "in many cases national identity emerges after the 
introduction (or importation) of one culture into another. This creates a reaction or rejection of 
indigenous culture to alien culture. The alien culture in the case of Ukraine since the end of the 
USSR is Russian, while indigenous is Ukrainian.  
Language is used as a tool or a model for expressing cultural and social differences 
across different groups. It binds nations over the course of time, keeping them and their history 
together. Bernsand (2001, 38) argues that “Notions on language and on social belonging linked 
to language can thereby work as mechanisms of exclusion and social boundary markers”. 
Therefore, language puts certain people on the inside, outside or between speech communities 
(Bernsand 2001, 39). Moreover, language provides access to economic, social and cultural goods 
for those who speak a group’s language.  
The unsettled nature of the language poses a big risk to the security of the state, thus 
needs to be resolved in a peaceful way (Litoshenko 2014). Prior studies have identified the 
geopolitical division of the Russian and the Ukrainian languages over the territory of Ukraine 
and its subsequent influence in defining the population’s attitudes towards foreign policy, 
cultural awareness, civil conduct, education, etc. (Prizel 1998, Kulyk 2016). The use of two 
languages demonstrates a co-existence of people who live in Ukraine and speak both Ukrainian 
and Russian. The presence of the minority Russian language in Ukraine has been a highly 
debated issue due to the long history of Russian influence over Ukraine, before and after 
Ukraine’s independence.  
Theoretical Framework 
My research focuses on the ethno-linguistic nationalism, its emergence and influence in 
Ukraine. It deals with the local-global continuum since the issues of language in the territory of 
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Ukraine go beyond the nation-state; local communities and relations between Ukraine and 
Russia, and other neighboring states of the European Union. My research also includes historical 
contextualization of Russo-Ukrainian relations as “it is impossible to understand the current 
geopolitical map and multiple conflicts without some understanding of the colonial past and 
imperial histories that established modern national boundaries and set up enduring ethnic and 
territorial tensions” (Darian-Smith and McCarty 2017, 47)  
The Ukrainian language policies can be understood best through ethno-nationalism. 
Ethno-nationalism is defined by belonging to a common ethnicity, shared culture and heritage 
(Csernicskó and Réka 2017). Speaking native language signifies a return to the roots, shared 
heritage that was denied and oppressed for so long. Privileging one language over the other gives 
nation the power to shape its national practices and identities. Therefore, there is no room for two 
languages competing for its status in the same territory (Csernicskó and Réka 2017).           
This case study builds on Kuzio’s (2002) and Kulyk's (2016) framework of nationalism 
in Ukraine, which is often perceived in negative manner due to the Russo-centricity. All liberal 
democracies are composed of combination of ethno-cultural and civic features, as a result, 
nationalism is a product of the modern state and an integral part of the state building (Kuzio 
2002). However, because the nationality was ignored during the Soviet Union, it laid a 
foundation for many scholars to define nationalism through the prism of the post-Soviet lenses 
(Kulyk 2016). Moreover, the ongoing Russian aggression – annexation of Crimea and war in 
eastern Ukraine – facilitates nationalist beliefs, in particular anti-Russian (Kulyk 2016). An 
external threat of Russia's political infringement resulted in reinforcement of the ethno-
nationalism in Ukraine. Kulyk (2016) attributes increased Ukrainian self-identification to the 
Euromaidan Revolution. 
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For example, Kiryukhin explains Ukrainian ethno-nationalism through focus on identity 
problems and nations self-determination. The focus of self-determination becomes salient 
through national memory, history, and culture. In this case study, independent Ukraine aimed " 
accentuating ethno-cultural differences between Ukraine and Russia" (Kiryukhin 2015). Russia 
serves as 'the other', and Ukrainian identity has been developing in rejection to it. The Ukrainian 
national identity is based on ethno-cultural ground due to nationalist discourse maintained by the 
government. Despite complex identity formation, language becomes a security and the marker of 
Ukrainian national identity.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Methodology 
I chose the case study method as a method of analysis as well as my specific research 
design for examining my research problem. I use an illustrative case study due to the descriptive 
nature of my research. Illustrative case studies utilize an event to demonstrate a given situation; 
they also serve the purpose of presenting unfamiliar phenomena to make them more familiar and 
to provide a common vocabulary and knowledge about the phenomena involved 
(“Writing@CSU” 2020). My intent is to provide an overview of a problem that is not commonly 
discussed within Ukraine or worldwide, namely – the connection between language and 
nationalism. The recent revolution in Ukraine has affected Ukrainian nationalism and national 
identity as well as language policy. The primary units of analysis are language and nationalism at 
the national and subnational levels. 
My bibliographic research included books, journals, newspapers and various specialized 
documents such as government documents and reports; as well as additional online sources of 
online journals and magazines, informative websites of relevant non-governmental and research 
organizations, blogs, databases, both in English and Ukrainian languages.   
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Both qualitative as well as quantitative data were examined due to the scope of this 
research project. Qualitative data was the most appropriate information for the examination of 
the issues involved in this study since it is focused on groups of individuals with different 
language preferences. Qualitative data, such as map of language distribution that I used in my 
research, was helpful in evaluating the preferences for the Ukrainian and Russian languages in 
certain settings and how they affect the notion of national identity. Sources of quantitative data 
were also used for evaluation of the language usage within the territory of Ukraine as well as 
presence of certain ethnic groups that affect language politics. 
Findings 
Before the USSR was formed, Ukraine’s land has always been considered a product of 
different “patterns of regional settlement” (Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Sakwa 2015). These 
patterns define Ukrainian and Russian speaking population that were settled on the opposite 
sides of the river Dnipro. Eastern Ukraine has its own ethnic community whose primary 
language has been Russian due to historical influence of tsarist Russia since the 18th century; 
while western Ukraine, whose land bounced between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 
the 16th century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the 18th century, is predominantly occupied 
by Ukrainian speaking population (See Figure 2). Figure 2 is a 2015 linguistic map of Ukraine, 
which demonstrates where the Ukrainian and the Russian languages are predominantly spoken. 
Pie charts numbers represent the percentage of the language spoken in that area. The colors 
represent the language, Russian, Ukrainian or other; orange color stands for Ukrainian as the 
main language used at home; dark blue is Russian as the main language spoken at home; less 
dark blue – mixed Ukrainian and Russian or bilingualism; green – other languages spoken at 
home. As it can be seen, eastern and southern Ukraine are marked blue with the primary 
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language Russian, central and northern Ukraine are primarily bilingual speakers, while the 
majority of western Ukraine is Ukrainian speaking. After independence the mixed language 
usage, surzhyk, was considered an embodiment of Soviet oppression and degraded culture 
(Bilaniuk 2005, 146). However, the use of surzhyk in everyday life has been changing to more 
positive attitudes.  
The Soviet legacy had direct influence over the social development of Ukraine and the 
nature of its bungled 'transition' (Torbakov 2000, 462). Majority of ethnic Ukrainians lived in 
'Russian Ukraine' where they "were offered a two-tiered identity - an imperial one (which was 
much broader than the ethnic term russkii1) and a regional one (malorusski2)" (Torbakov 2000, 
462). Russian hegemonic view of Ukrainians as 'younger brothers' was a major narrative during 
the Tsarist years and the Soviet Union (Riabchuk 2016).  
When Bolsheviks came to power in 1918, ethnic nationality was built around Russian 
dominance. There was an enforced idea of unity of all the Soviet republics as one Slavic 
civilization. Even though socialist republics had defined territorial units and superficial 
autonomy, Zubair argues that they were considered 'substitute nation-states' (Rather 2017). 
Soviet nation-building was characterized through the cultural imprint of the dominant Russian 
ethnic group. The USSR’s solution to the national problem was the creation of a one group of 
Soviet people, thus ensuring less possibility of ethnic confrontation. Due to the fact that during 
the Soviet Union Russian culture and language was forced on the non-Russians, it is believed to 
give rise to nationalist ideologies to the post-Soviet countries after they gained their 
independence. As a result, Ukraine, as a post-Soviet state is returning to the historiographic 
tradition, where the past needs to be rewritten and new identities to be formed. 
 
1 Russian identity that included all people of the Soviet Union Republics 
2 ‘a little’ Russian, embedded view of Ukrainians 
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When Ukraine became independent, making Ukrainian a state language was an important 
part of the constitution of independent Ukraine, even though Ukrainianization3 was ‘soft’. After 
independence Ukraine’s government was characterized by the low administrative capacity and 
unstable political leadership. This was not enough for radical reform, furthermore, to formulate a 
clear language policy. In the following years, Ukrainian identity started gaining its salience and 
shifting toward civic nationalism. The Russian language played a secondary status, but a very 
influential role in state structure, thus Ukrainization wasn’t successful in Russian-speaking east 
and south (Zhurzhenko 2000, 10). Correspondingly, due to the weak feeling of national unity, the 
Ukrainian people had doubts to which political community they belong. As a result of being 
oppressed by Soviets, Ukrainian ethnic identification was gradually acquiring its position. 
Moreover, new emerged Ukraine faced the disagreement on how to identify national collectivity, 
considering all the ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian citizens. 
During the Soviet Union existence, language played a major role in differentiating 
ethnicities, even though concept of nationhood was unclear. When the USSR fell apart, some 
people – predominantly eastern Ukraine – still identified themselves as ‘residents of the post-
Soviet space’ (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Sakwa 2015, Kulyk 2016). Even after Ukraine's 
independence the narrative of Russia as an 'older brother' remained deeply rooted in the society, 
taking away the legitimacy of the Ukrainian language, culture and its political sovereignty 
(Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Sakwa 2015). By enhancing the legal status of Ukrainian ‘own’ 
language, Ukraine is demonstrating its power against the dominant influence of Russia (Bilaniuk 
2005). It is a common way for many former Soviet countries to use a native language as a 
political weapon against the dominant Russia. As a result, many Ukraine’s policies were 
 
3 Promoting elements of Ukrainian culture 
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addressed towards increased use of national language in all spheres of public life (Korostelina 
2013).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
From 1991 until 2012, the Ukrainian language played the role of a sole state language. 
During that time, it was strongly used in schools, but weak in media and at work, while Russian 
took predominance in the informal oral setting and state institutions, mainly in western Ukraine 
(Arel 2017, 233). The 2012 Language Act gave more legitimacy to Russian language in the 
territory of Ukraine, which only intensified language conflict. The Act brought Russian to a new 
level where its dominance was politically acceptable if the Ukrainian language was promoted 
symbolically and through the national policies (Arel 2017, 233). The law was highly criticized 
for many reasons. First, it attempted to give the Russian language a status of a state’s second 
language. Second, it created less incentive for people to use Ukrainian. The protests against 
Russian language caused Russia to immediately announce that it would defend the Russian 
speaking minority from Ukrainian nationalism (Csernicskó and Réka 2017). 
As Onuch, Hale, and Sasse (2018) suggest, the country as ethnically divided as Ukraine 
is better understood in terms of different dimensions. Drawing on relational theory, these authors 
define these four dimensions as: “individual language preference, language embeddedness, 
ethnolinguistic identity, and nationality”. All of dimensions represent their own distinct 
relationships, but they also partly overlap and affect one's political views and behavior. These 
dimensions show the complexity of studying and measuring ethnic identity, and the need to 
consider its multidimensionality. National identity and language crisis in Ukraine have been the 
core of the Euromaidan revolution as they remain to be very powerful dictators of the nation’s 
policies (Onuch, Hale & Sasse 2018).  
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One of the main Ukrainian narratives is a reinterpretation of national identity through 
major alienation from Russia. As a result, in many spheres, the Russian language is seen as the 
oppressor's language. Over the years, nationalization of the Ukrainian language has been used as 
a weapon in negotiations over the country’s status and its political future (Bilaniuk 2005). Before 
Ukraine's independence, speaking Ukrainian was punished by the government. As a result, being 
able to speak the native Ukrainian language is not just a right, but also a defense of national 
interest. Language, in this case, became a collective unifying link for Ukrainian nation to 
establish post-Euromaidan Ukraine.  
Post-Euromaidan Ukrainian crisis broke ethnic stereotypes about Russians being ‘elder 
brothers’ (Torbakov 2011, 212). Changes due to revolution and eastern Ukraine alienation only 
increased the national identity crisis; attitudes toward the anthem and flag have improved (Kulyk 
2016, 600). Over the years, language intensified its position as a defining feature for one’s 
cultural belonging. Kulyk’s survey (2016, 600) demonstrated that Ukrainian language became 
perceived not only in legal terms as state language, but also “in symbolic terms, as the national 
language”. Being able to speak the native language has become a crucial factor to represent a 
true Ukrainian national identity and demonstrate alienation from the past. Majority of the 
population perceives the national identity as the someone who loves the Ukrainian anthem, flag, 
independence and language. 
In 2015, not too long after the Euromaidan revolution, President Poroshenko passed the 
new law of decommunization. The law eliminated most of the World War II monuments, Lenin 
statues, or anything that was related to Soviet non-Ukrainian figures; it also enforced renaming 
of public places nationwide (Marples 2018). Decommunization is seen as an important process 
of rethinking the past and ‘a chance’ for the future of the nation (Marples 2018). Figure 3 shows 
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a map of Ukraine with regions that need a name change. As of 2015, there were 3%4 of total 
places in Ukraine that had Soviet-related names. This data has been collected in accordance with 
the law “On the Condemnation of Communism and the National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian 
Regimes in Ukraine and the Prohibition of Propaganda of Their Symbols” (В Україні за півроку 
змінять назви 3% міст і сіл, 2016). 
Another enforcement of decommunization law was set up by the Institute of National 
Remembrance (INR).  The INR decommunization project mainly focuses on popularizing 
Ukrainian history: commemoration of the fighters for Ukrainian independence and victims of 
totalitarian regimes, preservation of the memory of the Euromaidan protests, creation of the 
Museum of the Revolution of National Dignity, and improving the teaching of the national 
history in schools (Marples 2018, 4). It is believed that many problems of contemporary Ukraine 
can be attributed to misconceptions about the “happy life” during the Soviet Ukraine. As was 
mentioned by Kulyk (2016), Russian involvement only facilitates Ukrainian nationalist beliefs; 
as a result, strengthening of Ukrainian history and culture through decommunization will ensure 
the future consolidation of the nation. 
Kiryukhin (2015) identified that nationalist thinking identifies three narratives: heroism, 
sacrifice, and romanticism. These narratives can be observed in Euromaidan time. The nation has 
mobilized to fight for its place in Europe. The government introduced language laws, limiting 
use of the Russian language or intensive use of the Ukrainian language, and introduced 
decommunization laws to alienate Soviet past. Finally, the nation is using Ukrainian nationalism 
to connect to its European ties.  
 
4 871 inhabited localities, 76 cities, and 795 villages 
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Kuzio (2002) has similar framework for understanding nationalism in Ukraine. One of 
them is extreme (radical) nationalism, which is the most common understanding of nationalism, 
referring to the extreme right (ethnic Ukrainian or Russian nationalists). Another one is a state 
(civic) nationalism, which “recognizes that liberal democracies are composed of civic and ethno-
cultural variants”. State nationalists support state independence and defend Ukraine's interest 
(Kuzio 2002). While Soviet Ukrainian nationalism is taking extreme left position, and in favor of 
joining the Russian-Belarusian union by destabilizing Ukrainian independence (Kuzio 2002). 
Today, the debate about language importance in the representation of one’s identity is 
very controversial in Ukraine. Many argue that keeping the Russian language on the territory of 
Ukraine will only destroy its culture because of a long imperial history that suppressed the native 
Ukrainian language (Csernicskó and Réka 2017; Kulyk 2015). While others support a united 
identity where Russian speaking Ukrainians are treated equally and can't be suppressed for their 
language that has a minority status (Zhurzhenko 2002). On the other hand, Kulyk (2015) argues 
that the "stronger Ukrainian identity doesn't mean a worse attitude toward Russian", therefore 
speaking Russian doesn't make someone less Ukrainian. 
Languages in Eastern Europe have served as a symbol of political and cultural opposition 
to the previous political regimes that have been closely associated with Russia. Many of Russia’s 
Eastern European neighbors are also reshaping their identities, just as Ukraine, which is “seeking 
to strengthen its own sense of Europeanness and distinguish itself from Russia, which is often 
cast as a non-European” (Marples 2018, Torbakov 2011, 215). Considering that Ukraine is a 
victimized state and a nation, it attempts to ‘cleanse’ its own national history from what’s 
considered a ‘false’, Soviet, history (Torbakov 2011).  
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National language and rejection of the past, including the Russian language alienation, 
brings the population their own sense of Europeanness - the new future, different from where 
they were once victimized. This new pro-European narrative is built on strengthening ties with 
Europe which can be done through conforming to the native language (Torbakov 2011, 215). For 
Ukraine, European identification means rejecting and ‘cleaning off’ everything that distinguishes 
it from Russia (Torbakov 2011, 215). By promoting Ukrainianization at the expense of the 
Russian language, Ukraine proves to be a much wanted “European choice” (Zhurzhenko 2002, 
3). As a result, creating stricter policies targeted on increased usage of state language in public 
spheres took place (Bilaniuk 2005) Such 'Europeanized' Ukraine is burning bridges with Russia, 
which poses a risk to Russian national security and its imperial identity. 
As a part of the plan for overcoming the ethno-cultural differences in Ukraine and 
demonstrating how one nation that speaks two languages can get along, Litoshenko (2014) 
suggests that the country should focus on spiritual integration rather than ethnic one. To preserve 
a unity, a new effective form of administrative-territorial reform needs to be developed. Due to 
current centralized unitary state failure and eastern Ukraine fighting for separation, there is a 
need for a more decentralized government that considers ethno-territorial communities.  
 This change for a better future of the nation would require a shift from national interest 
to a public one. Moreover, Ukraine needs to target existential values like love, freedom and 
unity, the personal development, regardless of national and religious affiliation. To achieve 
multicultural unity, recognition of regional identity needs to be put in perspective through a new 
set of laws. The stepping stone for building a strong society, where two languages are accepted, 
is through strengthening the spirit of Ukrainians as a united community (Litoshenko 2014, 104). 
And Russia, indeed, as a USSR successor, needs to take responsibility and recognize the crimes 
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that were committed by the Stalin regime to Russian people and other Eastern European 
countries (Torbakov 2011, 13). 
When it comes to present time, President Zelensky, as a Russian speaking Ukrainian, 
expressed his positive attitude towards using the Russian language and importance of prioritizing 
the Ukrainian language (Валерия Доброва, 2019). However, throughout his campaign he was 
condemned for his struggle speaking the Ukrainian language. On April 25, 2019, the Ukrainian 
Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) adopted the law on ensuring the Ukrainian language as the state 
language, which was signed by former President Poroshenko before the end of the term 
(Валерия Доброва, 2019). This law implies state authorities, local governments, educational 
institutions and hospitals to use solely the state language, which infringes the rights of Russian 
speaking population.     
Conclusion 
The formation of the national Ukrainian identity has been through many stages since 
Ukraine was divided and ruled by other dominant nations. Independent Ukraine brought new 
challenges to understanding and use of the Russian language. The Euromaidan protests became a 
new stage in Ukrainian life that brought its salience, defined by alienation from Russia and 
Soviet past. Post-Euromaidan time marked significant shift in language policies that aimed at the 
increased use of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of life. Reinterpreted history of Ukrainian 
nation demonstrated bigger love for Ukrainian anthem and flag as well as heroization of 
Ukrainian victims of totalitarian regimes.  
Further study of this nature would be very interesting to me. As was demonstrated by this 
research, language issue has been a hot debated topic and there are many more aspects of it that 
need to be researched. When I will have the next opportunity to conduct a research, I want to 
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focus on mixed language in Ukraine that includes elements of the Russian and Ukrainian 
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Figure 3. Map of Ukraine showing places that need name change to get rid of Soviet connection 
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